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Abstract
We examine two alternative strategies that an environmental group can embark when inter-
acting with a firm. The first one which is already discussed in the literature is when the 
group campaigns against the firm. The second one which has not been modelled in the 
literature is when the group collaborates with the firm (green alliance) to reduce the cost 
of the cleaner technology. We look at the case of both options being available for the group 
in a setting with an environmental tax. One of the main results of the paper argues that 
for higher taxation the conflict scenario is more likely to happen, implying that collabora-
tion and a more stringent environmental policy are substitutes. This identifies a previously 
unexamined and possibly adverse effect of public policy on environmental quality because 
it weakens the impact of the pollution tax on emission intensity. We also characterise the 
optimal tax that maximises social welfare and find that under pure conflict –when conflict 
is the only option for the environmentalists– optimal tax is higher than when the group can 
choose to act against or join forces with the firm, indicating that a less stringent environ-
mental policy is needed in the latter scenario.
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1 Introduction
Examples of environmental organisations clashing with businesses are surely not scarce. 
One of the environmental groups’ common practices, which affects market outcomes and 
consumers’ choices as well as environmental quality, is to increase consumers’ awareness 
via campaigns.1 For instance, Greenpeace campaigned against the construction of a new 
runway in London Heathrow airport as it would have derailed efforts to cut carbon emis-
sions.2 Additionally, as part of its campaign for the oil drilling in the Arctic, it has tar-
geted both LEGO over its partnership with oil corporation Shell and the largest oil and gas 
company in the world, the Russian energy provider Gazprom. After a 3-month campaign, 
LEGO announced that they would not renew their partnership with Shell.3
In recent years the relationship between an environmental group (EG henceforth) and 
a polluting firm has evolved. “Green alliances”, namely partnerships between an EG and 
a firm have become a new phenomenon for various reasons. From a firm’s perspective, 
its lack of expertise or public trust in addressing adequately environmental problems as 
well as the attempt to pre-empt attacks from environmental groups, the government and 
the media, provide substantial incentives to establish cooperation. Alliances with EGs have 
also been a source of information and knowledge for the firm about innovative ways to 
rethink production technologies, identify new products and address stakeholder concerns. 
In fact, it may even be the only choice to access the knowledge held by the environmental-
ists, since firms’ internal development of such expertise may be too costly, inefficient or 
time-consuming, and merger with or acquisition of an EG is highly unlikely (Rondinelli 
and London 2003). For the group, these alliances may offer more effective and efficient 
solutions than lobbying or campaigning against firms since, in an alliance, firms contribute 
to setting the environmental goals and hence their commitment to them can be stronger 
(Hartman and Stafford 1997). Also, competitors may follow the lead and adopt a similar 
practice which strengthens even further the benefits of the partnership.
There are different types of green alliances such as licencing, in which case the firm 
produces using the EG’s brand name, or product endorsement where the EG approves a 
firm’s product as being environmentally friendly. In this paper, we are focusing on the so-
called “green system alliances” or “task forces”, according to which the environmentalists 
assist the firm to develop and implement economically-feasible environmental programmes 
for the use of greener technologies.
Historically, the first (and unique at the time) partnership was between the Environmen-
tal Defence Fund (EDF) and McDonald’s in 1990. The EDF decided to take no money 
from McDonald’s in order to be able to examine their business practices objectively and 
make the data open to the public. The EG had successfully helped the chain through a 
waste reduction action plan to administer cost saving programmes such as replacing pol-
ystyrene clamshell boxes with recycled materials. According to the EDF, McDonald’s 
recycled one million tons of corrugated boxes, reduced packaging by £300 million and 
decreased waste from restaurants by 30%. Since then, partnerships have become more 
1 Other tools for educating consumers about the environmental impacts of a product’s manufacture apart 
from an EG’s campaign include price signalling of the high quality/ greener good (see e.g. Mahenc 2008), 
ecolabels (see e.g. Teisl et al. 2002) and firms’ own advertising to assist buyers to learn about the intangible 
characteristics of a product.
2 www.green peace .org.uk/10-reaso ns-heath row/.
3 www.green peace .org/inter natio nal/story /6999/how-lego-got-aweso me-to-savet hearc tic/.
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popular. For example, the EDF joined forces with more firms i.e., FedEx, Walmart and the 
private equity firm KKR.
In line with the aforementioned reasons why there can be a partnership between a firm 
and a group, in that first partnership and the ones thereafter, one of the main strengths that 
EGs were bringing to corporations was their specialised technical expertise as many pos-
sess knowledge that the companies lack (Yaziji and Doh 2009). Also, the EGs may know 
about a new technology that is superior only in its environmental impact which escaped 
firms’ attention. For example, in response to the Montreal Protocol’s call for eliminat-
ing ozone-destroying chlorofluorocarbons, the chemical industry had encouraged appli-
ance makers to replace them with hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), a less-harmful 
gas. DuPont and ICI invested more than $ 500 million in research into HCFCs. However, 
Greenpeace created a team of engineers who within a few months developed a refriger-
ator prototype that was efficient and good for the environment, the ozone layer and the 
climate. It was a mix of natural hydrocarbons. Greenpeace then collaborated with Foron 
who started designing GreenFreeze refrigerators. Generally, and as discussed above, envi-
ronmental groups can provide corporations with ecological, scientific and legal expertise 
(Milne et  al. 1996; Hartman and Stafford 1997) and hence we model collaboration as a 
reduction in the greener technology cost for the firm.
To the best of our knowledge, albeit the conflict scenario is used in the literature, the 
collaboration case has not been modelled yet. There are papers and reports, mainly in the 
managerial literature which focus on such an endeavour, evaluating its benefits and weak-
nesses and providing suggestions for future initiatives e.g., Arts (2002), Hartman and Staf-
ford (1997), Glasbergen and Groenenberg (2001), amongst others. However, no economic 
model exists which describes the EG’s strategy when both options are available and what 
affects its decision. Therefore, this paper provides the first formal analysis of green alli-
ances in a setting with an environmental tax.
The idea of environmentalists conflicting with firms and how this antagonistic relation-
ship can affect environmental quality and social welfare have already been investigated by 
a large strand of literature (see e.g., Friehe 2013; Sartzetakis et  al. 2012; Petrakis et  al. 
2005; Heyes and Maxwell 2004; Liston-Heyes 2001). The present paper is closest to Hei-
jnen and Schoonbeek (2008) who examine a market in which a monopolistic firm supplies 
an environmentally unfriendly good. They characterise the equilibrium of an entry deter-
rence game, where an EG can enter the market and set up a campaign to inform consum-
ers about the environmental damage. They find that the aggregate environmental damage 
is lowest if the firm is able to deter entry of the environmentalists and the group’s fixed 
entry cost is small enough. In the present paper we too consider conflict (campaigning by 
the EG), but add two aspects, namely, the presence of an emission tax, and the possibil-
ity of collaboration. Even though we do not model deterrence, our analysis indicates that 
damages are indeed lower if the EG and polluting firm do not go into conflict. But we also 
show that the presence of the tax makes campaigning by the EG (conflict) more likely.
Furthermore, Heijnen (2013) investigates the incentives that the group has to inform 
consumers while Van der Made (2014) studies how these incentives are affected by the 
level of competition in the market. We add to these works by examining the incentives to 
inform consumers (i.e., campaigning by the EG) arising from the presence of an emission 
tax. Overall, the literature has not characterised the optimal emission tax in the presence 
of an EG and a polluting firm, where these may go into conflict or collaborate with each 
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other.4 Surprisingly, the characterisation of the optimal tax in this setting is new to the lit-
erature, despite an important number of industries where this sort of policy is widely used 
(e.g., Tietenberg 2013) and, at the same time, examples where an EG and a polluting firm 
collaborate/go into conflict.
We present a model in which the environmental group has two options: to campaign 
against a polluting firm which would shrink consumers’ demand for the firm’s product or 
to join forces with the firm which would reduce the cost of implementing a greener tech-
nology. The group bases its decision on which option results in lower total emissions. In 
the model the environmentalists’ decision is affected by an environmental tax set at the 
outset by the government. One of the main results of the analysis is that higher taxation 
makes the conflict option more likely to be adopted by the EG. The reason behind this 
result is that under conflict taxation is more effective in lowering emissions and, there-
fore, the likelihood of the EG of opting for conflict is higher given that they care about 
the environmental quality. In other words, we find that collaboration and a more stringent 
environmental policy are substitutes. Since emissions intensity is higher under conflict than 
under collaboration, this result uncovers a previously unexplored, possibly adverse effect of 
strengthening emissions taxation on environmental quality.
The government sets the environmental tax and aims to maximise social welfare which 
is defined as the sum of consumer and producer surplus minus the negative externality 
from pollution, in the presence of uncertainty about the possibility of conflict and col-
laboration. This setup also captures the idea that the government will not directly encour-
age collaboration or conflict, a role associated with the presence of the EG who decides 
whether to collaborate or go into conflict with the polluting firm. We find that the optimal 
tax rate in the case where conflict is the only option for the environmentalists (i.e., the case 
examined in the literature) is higher compared to the case where taxation affects the EG’s 
choice between conflict and collaboration. The optimised level of social welfare is higher 
in the latter case. These results point to the extent of substitutability between taxation and 
collaboration: with a chance for collaboration there is room to set a smaller tax since emis-
sions are lower due to the transfer of know-how from the EG to the polluting firm.
The analysis also indicates that a lower degree of transfer of technological know-how 
from the EG to the polluting firm raises the likelihood of conflict, where emissions are 
higher, thereby resulting in higher taxation. This result is relevant given the increasingly 
important role of technology in addressing damages from pollution (e.g., Stern 2006; Bar-
rett 2006; Hoel and De Zeeuw 2010). Our analysis therefore contributes to a branch of the 
literature which examines the role of technology by pointing to the transfer of know-how as 
a way to reduce the likelihood of conflict and, potentially, the need for aggressive taxation.
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. Section  2.1 presents the model, 
while in Sect. 2.2, we solve for the firm’s optimal choice. In Sect.  2.3, we solve for the 
environmental group’s optimal decision and discuss how it is affected by the environmental 
tax. In Sect.  2.4, we introduce the social welfare function the government aims to max-
imise and Sect. 2.5 characterises optimal policy. We also present numerical examples of 
4 There are other papers in the literature which examine the role of an EG. For example, Van der Made and 
Schoonbeek (2009) consider a model of vertical product differentiation where consumers care about the 
environmental damage their consumption causes. Similar to the Heijnen and Schoonbeek (2008) paper, an 
EG is present and capable of increasing consumers’ environmental concern via a campaign. However, in the 
present paper we do not consider product differentiation and the effects of campaigning by the EG and the 
role cleaner technology separately.
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the optimal tax rate and show how the optimal tax rate is affected by changes in relevant 
parameters of the model (Sect. 2.6). Section 3 concludes.
2  The Model
In this section we present the model, and the firm’s and environmental group’s optimal 
choices.
2.1  Preference, Technology and Strategies
Consider a market with a profit-maximising monopolist whose production of a single good 
pollutes the environment with an emission intensity (i.e., emissions per unit of product) 
denoted by e > 0 . For simplicity, market demand is linear, p = ai−q , where ai > 0 and q 
denotes quantity. We denote by 𝛾 > 0 the component of the monopolist’s unit cost of pro-
duction which is independent of the environmental characteristics of the production tech-
nology chosen by the firm. Moreover, we assume that the monopolist’s unit cost of produc-
tion has a second component, inversely related to the emission intensity of the adopted 
technology, zi 1
e
 , where zi > 0 . The firm’s emissions are taxed by the government at the tax 
rate, t.
In this market, an environmental group (EG) aims at minimising total emissions, eq, by 
choosing between two options.5 It can conflict with the monopolist by campaigning against 
it. In such a case, the campaign will induce a certain degree of environmental awareness 
among consumers which will cause a reduction of the demand parameter ai from a > 0 to 
a훿 where 훿 is a random variable uniformly distributed over the interval [h, 1] with density 
function f (훿) . The alternative option for the EG is to collaborate with the firm by sharing 
its know-how on the adoption of the greener technology, thus facilitating the firm in reduc-
ing the unit cost of adopting a cleaner technology. Formally, with collaboration with the 
EG the second component of the monopolist’s cost of production, zi 1
e
 , reduces the param-
eter zi from z > 0 to zm where m ∈ (0, 1) . Based on these building blocks, the firm’s profits 
can be written as follows:
for i = {conf , coll} which is an index denoting the EG’s decision between conflict and 
collaboration.
The timing of events is as follows. In stage one, the government sets the emissions tax 
rate t. In stage two, uncertainty on 훿 (i.e., the inverse measure of effectiveness of the con-
flict option) is resolved and, based on this, the EG decides whether to conflict or collabo-
rate with the firm.6 In the third stage, the firm chooses the emission intensity, e, and out-
put, q, simultaneously. The timing of the game is relevant to the examples discussed in 
Πi = (a
i − q)q − teq − zi
1
e
q − 훾q
5 We assume that both options entail the same cost for the group (either monetary or psychological). This is 
assumed for tractability and to guarantee a closed form solution for 훿.
6 As in the example with Greenpeace and Foron discussed in the Introduction, the EG can assess how 
effective a campaign would be under these particular circumstances and their objective to reduce total emis-
sions. Hence uncertainty on 훿 is resolved and then the group decides whether it is best to conflict or col-
laborate with the firm.
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the Introduction - looking at the Greenpeace and Foron collaboration example, the group 
moved before the firm choosing whether to campaign or collaborate with the firm and then 
the firm made the production decisions.7 The model is solved via backward induction.
2.2  The Monopolist’s Decision
The maximisation of the monopolist’s profits with respect to q and e gives
Substituting (2) into (1) we obtain the profit-maximising quantity
or explicitly, under the two alternative scenarios of conflict or collaboration,
From (3) the quantity produced in the collaboration case is positively affected by the reduc-
tion of the unit cost of employing a greener technology. In other words, collaboration 
reduces the firm’s emission intensity but increases its total production. On the contrary, in 
the conflict case the action of the EG just causes a contraction in demand (via 훿 ) and hence 
in firm’s total production, for given emission intensity. Therefore, output under collabora-
tion is higher than the output under conflict.
Firm’s profits can be written as
and as they are the square of the expression for the output, we can see that profits are 
higher under collaboration than conflict. Total emissions are
It is easy to show that equilibrium quantity, emission rate, profits and total emissions are 
all negatively affected by the environmental tax. As the tax rate increases, the firm has a 
stronger incentive to lower emissions by employing a cleaner technology. In addition, the 
overall unit cost of production increases causing a reduction in the equilibrium production 
level and firm’s profits.
(1)휕Πi
휕q
= ai − 훾 − 2q − te −
zi
e
= 0⇔ q =
ai − 훾 − te −
zi
e
2
,
(2)휕Πi
휕e
= −tq +
zi
e2
q = 0⇔ e =
√
zi
t
.
qi =
ai − 훾 − 2
√
zit
2
(3)qconf =
a훿 − 훾 − 2
√
zt
2
and qcoll =
a − 훾 − 2
√
zmt
2
.
Πi =
(ai − 훾 − 2
√
zit)2
4
eiqi =
ai − 훾 − 2
√
zit
2
�
zi
t
.
7 Our results are robust to changes in the timing of events. For example, if the firm was making the technol-
ogy (e) and the production (q) decisions at different stages and not simultaneously.
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2.3  The EG’s Decision
The EG will choose to collaborate with the firm if the total emissions generated under col-
laboration are lower than total emissions under conflict, ecollqcoll < econf qconf  ; that is,
From the inequality in (4) we derive a threshold value for 훿 , 𝛿 , above (below) which the EG 
prefers to collaborate (conflict) with the firm:
Hence, we define the ranges of 훿 for which the EG will choose to collaborate or go into 
conflict as follows:
It is noteworthy that the aforementioned ranges are consistent with the fact that 훿 is distrib-
uted between h and 1.8
Next, we analyse the effect of the tax on the threshold value 𝛿 . In particular, from (5) it 
is easily shown that an increase in the tax rate increases the critical value of 훿 , 𝛿:
since m < 1.
Proposition 1 A higher environmental tax makes the scenario of the EG conflicting with 
the firm more likely.
Proposition 1 presents a result according to which a higher tax will move 𝛿 to the right 
making the interval [h, 𝛿) bigger so that the event of conflict is now more likely to hap-
pen. This result is in line with the evolution of the Environmental Policy Stringency Index9 
and the anecdotal evidence about partnerships and the number of campaigns against firms. 
Even though partnerships are more likely to be supported in industrialised countries (Chan 
2002,  p. 116), the relationship between corporations and non-for-profits “has typically 
remained tense” (Rondinelli and London 2003).
The intuition here lies in the environmentalists’ objective. The group cares about the 
environment and in particular emissions. When taxation increases, total emissions under 
conflict fall at a higher rate compared to the decrease in emissions under collaboration. 
Therefore, the group will be more likely to decide to conflict with the firm since such an 
action will imply less pollution. That is,
(4)
a − 𝛾 − 2
√
zmt
2
�
zm
t
<
a𝛿 − 𝛾 − 2
√
zt
2
�
z
t
.
(5)ecollqcoll < (>)econf qconf , if 𝛿 > (<)
(a − 𝛾 − 2
√
zmt)
√
m + 𝛾 + 2
√
zt
a
≡ 𝛿
{
conflict if 𝛿 ∈ [h, 𝛿)
collaborate if 𝛿 ∈ (𝛿, 1]
𝜕𝛿
𝜕t
=
−2m
√
z
1
2
√
t
+ 2
√
z
1
2
√
t
a
=
(1 − m)
�
z
t
a
> 0
8 In particular, since 훿 ∈ (h, 1) , then (i) 𝛿 > 𝛿 implies 𝛿 < 1 , and (ii) 𝛿 < 𝛿 implies 𝛿 > h.
9 https ://stats .oecd.org/Index .aspx?DataS etCod e=EPS.
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where 𝜕econf∕𝜕t > 𝜕ecoll∕𝜕t in absolute terms since m < 1 , implying that the effect of an 
increase in the tax rate on emission intensity will be bigger under conflict. Similarly, for the 
quantities we obtain
where 𝜕qconf∕𝜕t > 𝜕qcoll∕𝜕t in absolute terms since m < 1 meaning that the effect of an 
increase in the tax rate on output is stronger under conflict.
The effect of the tax on emission intensity under conflict is stronger since under collabo-
ration, the technology chosen by the firm is already greener due to the alliance with the EG 
and thus the effect of taxation in this case is weaker. For the same reason, the effect of the 
tax on output is larger under conflict. Hence, total emissions fall at a higher rate when the 
environmentalists clash with the firm. The intuition of this proposition lies in the effect of 
an increase in the tax rate on emission intensity. On the one hand it incentivises the firm to 
adopt a greener technology, and on the other hand under the collaboration case this effect 
is already milder due to the already reduced emission intensity. Therefore, a higher tax is 
more effective under the conflict case.
It is also worth noting that Proposition 1 identifies a previously unexplored, possibly 
adverse effect of public policy on environmental quality. Particularly, a more stringent 
environmental policy increases the likelihood that the environmentalists will not collabo-
rate with the firm, an effect that not only mitigates the impact of the pollution tax on emis-
sion intensity, but also leads to lower output.
We conclude this section by stating the following assumption which ensures that the 
production-expanding effect of collaboration is dominated by the reduction in the emis-
sion intensity so that, for given demand conditions, collaboration always decreases total 
emissions.
Assumption 1 The parameter space is restricted by the following inequality 
ah − 훾 ≥ 4√zt.
This assumption says that the transfer of know-how from the EG to the monopolist 
results in lower emissions than conflict, i.e., the EG would always prefer collaboration, for 
given demand conditions. Of course, the EG’s decision will depend on the realisation of 
훿 and whether it will be greater or lower than 𝛿 . The relevance of this assumption will be 
apparent in Sect. 2.5.4. See “Appendix” for a proof.
2.4  Social Welfare
We define the social welfare function as the sum of consumer and producer surplus, and 
tax revenue minus the negative externality from pollution under each case. Specifically, 
consumer surplus is given by
휕econf
휕t
= −
√
z
2t3∕2
,
휕ecoll
휕t
= −
√
zm
2t3∕2
휕qconf
휕t
= −
√
z
2
√
t
,
휕qcoll
휕t
= −
√
zm
2
√
t
CSi = ∫
1
h
� ( ai−훾−2√zit
2
)2
2
�
f (훿)d훿,
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the producer surplus as the firm’s profits
tax revenue as
and the negative externality from pollution as total emissions10
where f (훿) = 1
1−h
.
It is important to note that the government cares about the perceived welfare of citizens, 
and that the government will not directly campaign against pollution or will directly help 
the firm to implement greener technologies; this is a role already associated with the pres-
ence of the EG. Therefore, the social welfare function that the government maximises can 
be written as
The SW function aims to examine the scenario where the group has the choice to col-
laborate or conflict with the firm rather than the conflict-only case. The function can be 
re-written as
Hence, substituting into (6) the expressions for qcoll , qconf  , ecoll , econf  , letting 휂 ≡ 훾 + 2√zt 
for notational simplicity and integrating yields (see section I of the online Appendix for a 
detailed derivation):
Πi = ∫
1
h
� (ai − 훾 − 2√zit)2
4
�
f (훿)d훿,
teiqi = ∫
1
h
�
t
ai − 훾 − 2
√
zit
2
�
zi
t
�
f (훿)d훿
eiqi = ∫
1
h
�ai − 훾 − 2√zit
2
�
zi
t
�
f (훿)d훿
SW =∫
𝛿
h
[(CSconf + teconf qconf ) + Πconf − econf qconf ]f (𝛿)d𝛿
����������������������������������������� ����������������������������������������
SW under conflict
+∫
1
𝛿
[(CScoll + tecollqcoll) + Πcoll − ecollqcoll]f (𝛿)d𝛿
��������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������
SW under collaboration
(6)
SW =∫
𝛿
h
[(q2
conf
2
+ teconf qconf
)
+ q2
conf
− econf qconf
]
f (𝛿)d𝛿
+ ∫
1
𝛿
[(q2
coll
2
+ tecollqcoll
)
+ q2
coll
− ecollqcoll
]
f (𝛿)d𝛿
10 We assume linear damage from emissions.
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2.5  Optimal Taxation
In this section we characterise the optimal tax and examine the role of the conflict and col-
laborate components of the welfare function (case 1, Sect. 2.5.1), but also how the likeli-
hood of conflict affects this characterisation (case 2, Sect. 2.5.2). Differentiation of (7) with 
respect to the tax gives (see section I of the online Appendix for a detailed derivation):
where H > 0 , 𝛿 − h > 0 , 1 − 𝛿 > 0 , a(𝛿 + h) − 2𝜂 > 0 , m − 1 < 0 , 𝜕𝛿∕𝜕t > 0 , 𝜕qcoll∕𝜕t < 0
.
Setting 휕SW∕휕t = 0 and solving for t (i.e., (1 − t)H ) gives
Equation (9) characterises the optimal tax.11
2.5.1  Case 1: @ı̂∕@t = 0
To analyse the optimal tax, first let’s assume 𝜕𝛿∕𝜕t = 0 ; we look at the role of 𝜕𝛿∕𝜕t in 
Sect. 2.5.2.
In (9) the first term puts an upward pressure on the tax to address damages from pol-
lution from both the collaborate and conflict components in the welfare function. More-
over, the term, (𝛿 − h)(−a(𝛿 + h) + 2𝜂)econf < 0 , captures (from the conflict component) 
the downward pressure on the tax to increase consumer surplus, tackle the output distor-
tion and raise profits. Analogously, the third term captures the downward pressure on the 
tax due to consumer surplus, output distortion and profits effects (from the collaboration 
(7)
(1 − h)SW =
(
𝛿3 − h3
) a2
12
(
1
2
+ 1
)
−
(
𝛿2 − h2
)a
4
(
1
2
𝜂 + 𝜂 + econf − econf t
)
+
(
𝛿 − h
)𝜂
2
(
1
4
𝜂 +
1
2
𝜂 + econf − econf t
)
+
(
1 − 𝛿
)(1
2
q2
coll
+ q2
coll
− ecollqcoll + ecollqcollt
)
(8)
(1 − h)
𝜕SW
𝜕t
= (1 − t)H +
[
1
8
econf
(
𝛿 − h
)(
−a(𝛿 + h) + 2𝜂
)
+
(
1 − 𝛿
)
qcoll
𝜕qcoll
𝜕t
+
𝜕𝛿
𝜕t
3
2
q2
coll
(m − 1)
]
(9)
t =1 +
[
1
8
econf
(
𝛿 − h
)(
−a(𝛿 + h) + 2𝜂
)
+
(
1 − 𝛿
)
qcoll
𝜕qcoll
𝜕t
+
𝜕𝛿
𝜕t
3
2
q2
coll
(m − 1)
]/
H
11 Second-order condition holds (see section 2 of the online Appendix).
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component) i.e., (1 − 𝛿)qcoll(𝜕qcoll∕𝜕t) < 0 . The tax revenue effects (from the conflict and 
collaboration components) are completely offset and thus do not show up in (9).12
Overall, the presence of the possibility of collaboration between the EG and monopolist 
puts a downward pressure on the tax because the possibility of collaboration implies lower 
emissions via the transfer of know-how.
2.5.2  Case 2: @ı̂∕@t > 0
The presence of the term 𝜕𝛿∕𝜕t further puts a downward pressure on the tax. This is 
because a higher chance of conflict ( 𝜕𝛿∕𝜕t > 0 ) results in lower profits and gains from con-
sumer surplus.
Since 𝜕𝛿∕𝜕t is positive it indicates how the presence of the tax increases the chances of 
conflict. This is because in the intervals for conflict and collaboration a higher 𝛿 (due to the 
presence of the tax) renders the range [h, 𝛿) larger, and the range (𝛿, 1] smaller. With this in 
mind, the term (𝜕𝛿∕𝜕t)q2
coll
(m − 1) < 0 in (9) further puts an downward pressure on the tax. 
This is because with a higher chance of conflict the gains in consumer surplus that would 
have resulted from collaboration decrease (since under collaboration output is higher rela-
tive to conflict) and so the government lowers the tax to offset this. Moreover, the term 
(𝜕𝛿∕𝜕t)(m − 1)q2
coll
< 0 also indicates that with higher chances of conflict due to the pres-
ence of the tax, profits fall (since output is likely to be smaller in conflict) and so the gov-
ernment lowers the tax to offset profit loss. It is noteworthy that the reason the effects from 
damages via the term 𝜕𝛿∕𝜕t do not show up in (9) is because the damage-reducing effect 
from the collaboration component (emissions are lower under collaboration) in the welfare 
function is just offset by the damage-increasing effect coming from the conflict component.
Overall, the term in brackets in (9) is negative, and so the implication is that the tax 
is set below marginal damages. This is consistent with the literature e.g., Barnett (1980), 
Requate (2006).
Proposition 2 The optimal tax is set below marginal damages.
Proposition 3 The higher the chance for conflict (i.e., 𝜕𝛿∕𝜕t > 0 ) the smaller the optimal 
tax.
2.5.3  Taxation: Conflict vis‑à‑vis Conflict/Collaboration
This section compares the optimal tax in the case where the EG can only go into conflict 
with the monopolist (thereafter also referred to as first scenario) with the case where the 
EG has a choice of conflict or collaboration (thereafter also referred to as second scenario). 
We show that the optimal tax under the first scenario is larger than the optimal tax in the 
second scenario. The reason for this result is that taxation is lower given the possibility of 
12 From the collaboration component emissions per unit of output are lower (due to the transfer of know-
how from the EG to the monopolist) and so the government raises the tax to recover lost revenue; and from 
the conflict component the effect is in general ambiguous. This is because there are two effects at play. On 
the one hand, due to conflict output falls and so does tax revenue thus prompting the government to raise 
the tax. But on the other, emissions per unit of output rise thereby reducing the need to raise the tax to raise 
revenue. These revenue effects are completely offset by consumer and profit effects.
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collaboration since under collaboration emissions are lower, thereby offering extra room 
for a lower tax.
The strategy here is to first characterise the tax in the conflict-only case. We then evalu-
ate the first-order condition of the welfare function where the EG has the choice of going 
into conflict or collaboration at the conflict-only tax. At the conflict-only tax, if the first-
order condition of the welfare function where the EG has the choice of going into con-
flict or collaboration is negative (positive), then the tax in the conflict-only case is greater 
(smaller) than the tax in the case where the EG has the choice of going into conflict or col-
laboration. We assume strict concavity of the welfare functions. Figure 1 illustrates the key 
result from the analysis.
Assumption 2 Suppose the welfare functions are strictly concave.
First, consider the welfare function for the conflict-only case, SW∗:
where variable definitions are the same as before. Differentiation of (10) gives
where H∗ > 0 (see section I of the online Appendix). Setting Eq. (11) equal to zero, and 
under assumption 2, yields an optimal tax, t∗ , when the EG goes into conflict only.13
(10)
(1 − h)SW∗ =
(
13 − h3
) a2
12
(
1
2
+ 1
)
−
(
12 − h2
)a
4
(
1
2
휂 + 휂 + econf − econf t
)
+ (1 − h)
휂
2
(
1
4
휂 +
1
2
휂 + econf − econf t
)
(11)(1 − h)휕SW
∗
휕t
=(1 − t)H∗ +
(1 − h)
8
√
z√
t
(−a(1 + h) + 2휂)
Fig. 1  Optimal tax: conflict-only and conflict/collaboration
13 Second-order condition holds (see section 2 of the online Appendix).
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Next, setting (11) equal to zero and evaluating it into (8) gives (see section I of the 
online Appendix for a detailed derivation):
This leads us to the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Taxation in the conflict-only case, t∗ , is greater than taxation in the case 
where the EG has the choice of conflict or collaboration i.e., t∗ > t.
According to Proposition 4, in the case where conflict is the only option for the environ-
mentalists the optimal tax is higher relative to the case where the group has the option of 
conflict or collaboration with the firm, implying that a less stringent environmental policy 
is required in the second scenario. This is due to the way that the environmental tax alters 
the probability of conflict compared to collaboration in favour of the former.
2.5.4  Taxation Under Conflict/Collaboration and Changes in m
This section examines the extent to which changes in m affect optimal taxation in the case 
where the EG has the choice of conflict or collaboration. We show that the effects of m on t 
depend on two factors: (i) the relative weight the government puts on damages from pollu-
tion and (ii) the degree to which changes in m affect the threshold level of 𝛿.
The idea here is that changes in m affect the threshold level of 𝛿 and therefore the role of 
the conflict and collaboration components which characterize the optimal tax. An increase 
in m increases the chance of conflict (i.e., the ranges [h, 𝛿) and (𝛿, 1] change since 𝛿 changes 
with m), lowers the transfer of know-how from the EG to the monopolist and increases 
total emissions (by Assumption  1 emissions increase since emissions per unit of output 
increase sufficiently to offset any reductions in output resulting from an increase in m). In 
turn, these affect the characterization of the optimal tax, where the optimal tax is likely to 
be adjusted upwards, particularly if the government puts a relatively large weight on dam-
ages from pollution. This is because with a higher threshold, 𝛿 , the EG is more likely to 
conflict and thus the transfer of know-how from the EG to the monopolist diminishes, and 
at the same time emissions rise.
To see these results, we differentiate the first-order condition in Eq. (8) SWt(t(m),m) = 0 
(subscripts denote partial derivatives), which yields −SWtttm = SWtm , where SWtt < 0 . The 
sign of SWtm dictates the sign of tm . In particular,
(12)(1 − h)
𝜕SW
𝜕t
|||| 𝜕SW∗
𝜕t
=0
<0
(13)
(1 − h)SWtm =(1 − t)
𝜕H
𝜕m
+
𝜕𝛿
𝜕t
3
2
�
2qcoll(m − 1)
𝜕qcoll
𝜕m
+ q2
coll
�
+
𝜕2𝛿
𝜕t𝜕m
3
2
(m − 1)q2
coll
+ (1 − 𝛿)
�
qcoll
𝜕2qcoll
𝜕t𝜕m
+
𝜕qcoll
𝜕t
𝜕qcoll
𝜕m
�
>0, if a𝛿 > a − (1 − m)24
√
zt > 0
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where 1 − t > 0 , 𝜕H∕𝜕m > 0 , 𝜕𝛿∕𝜕t > 0 , 𝜕qcoll∕𝜕m < 0 , m − 1 < 0 , 𝜕2𝛿∕𝜕t𝜕m < 0 , and 
qcoll(𝜕
2qcoll∕𝜕t𝜕m) + (𝜕qcoll∕𝜕t)(𝜕qcoll∕𝜕m) < 0 (see section I of the online appendix for a 
detailed derivation).14
The sign of (13) is in general ambiguous. The first and second terms (each posi-
tive) denote adjustments in the tax arising from changes in damages from pollution both 
because conflict is more likely and thus emissions are higher, and the transfer of know-
how from the EG to the monopolist is smaller. The third term (positive) indicates adjust-
ments in the tax due to changes in the effectiveness of the tax in altering the threshold 
𝛿 (see Proposition 1): with an increase in m the ability of the tax to serve as a substitute 
for collaboration diminishes (since there is a loss in the EG’s transfer of know-how to 
the monopolist due to higher m), thereby pushing the tax upwards. And the fourth term, 
qcoll(𝜕
2qcoll∕𝜕t𝜕m) + (𝜕qcoll∕𝜕t)(𝜕qcoll∕𝜕m) < 0 , denotes the downward adjustment in the 
tax because output falls with a diminished transfer of know-how.
Overall the sign of (13) is positive (i.e., tm > 0 ) if damages from pollution and the loss 
in the transfer of know-how from the EG to the monopolist are large i.e., if chances of con-
flict are sufficiently large, a𝛿 > a − (1 − m)24
√
zt > 0 . This is because with a sufficiently 
large threshold 𝛿 emissions are likely to rise (because conflict is more likely to have higher 
emissions per unit of output). But also with conflict more likely there is a higher chance of 
losing the transfer of know-how. As a result, the government is more likely to adjust the tax 
upwards to address the loss of transfer and increase in damages from pollution.
Proposition 5 Consider an increase m. Then, the tax is adjusted upwards if the loss in 
the transfer of know-how from the EG to the monopolist and damages from pollution are 
sufficiently large.
2.6  Numerical Exercise: Pure Conflict versus Conflict or Collaboration
In this section, we undertake a numerical exercise to explore the effect of changes in the 
parameters on the optimal tax and social welfare, as well as further check our result that 
environmental policy should be less stringent when the EG faces the option between col-
laboration and conflict. In line with section 2.5.3, we begin by looking at the first scenario 
(using Eq. 10) where the only option for the group is to conflict with the firm; in other 
words, environmentalists only act against the firm – the scenario commonly presented by 
scholars. This is then compared with the second scenario (using Eq. 7) which is presented 
as the case where the environmentalists face two options, to either join forces with the firm 
or clash with it. For these two scenarios, we calculate the optimal tax rate for different val-
ues of the parameters and the corresponding social welfare level in each case.
In the following table we show that for different parameter values15 the optimal tax rate in 
the first scenario, t∗ , is higher than in the second one, t∗∗ (i.e., t∗ > t∗∗ ) indicating that a more 
stringent environmental policy is needed when the only strategy for the environmentalists is to 
conflict with the firm or, in other words, that collaboration and a more stringent policy are sub-
stitutes. This result supports Proposition 4 and is in line with Proposition 1 since higher taxa-
tion is in favour of having conflict between the group and the firm. Thus, in the case in which 
14 In (13) the term 𝜕𝛿∕𝜕m(⋅) = 0 . The effects via 𝜕𝛿∕𝜕m(⋅) vanish since two effects cancel each other out: 
an upward tax adjustment to offset the reduction in tax revenue (the loss in revenue since output falls with a 
higher m) cancels out a downward tax adjustment due to reductions in output because of the higher chances 
for conflict.
15 These values are random values from the parameter space.
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the group faces the option to either cooperate or clash with the firm, the optimal policy should 
be less stringent and therefore result in higher consumer surplus due to the smaller decrease of 
output relative to the first scenario (conflict only).
Table 1 shows the optimal tax rate under the two scenarios while changing the parameter 
values m, z, a, h and, in parentheses, the corresponding social welfare values.
Starting with changes in m, we can see that a higher m, i.e., the firm being benefited less 
from the cooperation with the group, increases the optimal tax rate in the second scenario 
which is in line with Proposition 5. This can be explained by considering a higher m as less 
transfer of the group’s know-how and thus a higher optimal tax rate is required to discourage 
the firm from producing with a higher emission intensity. We also find that this tax rate is 
lower than the tax rate in the pure conflict case. Of course, in the first scenario the changes in 
m do not affect the tax since there is not a possibility of cooperating with the firm.
We repeat this comparative statics exercise for the other parameters. Having a higher opti-
mal tax rate for the pure conflict case (first scenario) relative to the second scenario also holds 
for different values of the demand parameter a. It is interesting to see that, for higher values of 
a, the optimal tax rate is decreasing in both cases. This may seem counter-intuitive, however 
it can be explained when taking into account the effect of a on 𝛿 . In particular, using equation 
(5) and taking the derivative of 𝛿 with respect to a, we obtain
𝜕𝛿
𝜕a
=
a
√
m − (a
√
m − 𝛾
√
m − 2
√
ztm + 𝛾 + 2
√
zt)
a2
=
(𝛾 + 2
√
zmt)
√
m − (𝛾 + 2
√
zt)
a2
< 0
Table 1  Optimal tax for different parameter values
Values of m a = 100, z = 20, a = 100, z = 20, a = 100, z = 20,
훾 = 10,퐦 = 0.6, 훾 = 10,퐦 = 0.7, 훾 = 10,퐦 = 0.8,
h = 0.4 h = 0.4 h = 0.4
Optimal tax for SW
firstscenario
t
∗ = 0.529 (1, 108) t∗ = 0.529 (1, 108) t∗ = 0.529 (1, 108)
Optimal tax for SW
secondscenario
t
∗∗ = 0.412 (1, 294) t∗∗ = 0.458 (1, 206) t∗∗ = 0.496 (1, 149)
Values of a 퐚 = 50, z = 20, 퐚 = 100, z = 20, 퐚 = 150, z = 20,
훾 = 10,m = 0.7, 훾 = 10,m = 0.7, 훾 = 10,m = 0.7,
h = 0.4 h = 0.4 h = 0.4
Optimal tax for SW
firstscenario
t
∗ = 0.579 (130) t∗ = 0.529 (1, 108) t∗ = 0.518 (3, 062)
Optimal tax for SW
secondscenario
t
∗∗ = 0.507 (143) t∗∗ = 0.458 (1, 206) t∗∗ = 0.447 (3, 323)
Values of z a = 100, 퐳 = 10, a = 100, 퐳 = 20 a = 100, 퐳 = 30,
훾 = 10,m = 0.7, 훾 = 10,m = 0.7, 훾 = 10,m = 0.7,
h = 0.4 h = 0.4 h = 0.4
Optimal tax for SW
firstscenario
t
∗ = 0.520 (1, 207) t∗ = 0.529 (1, 108) t∗ = 0.536 (1, 036)
Optimal tax for SW
secondscenario
t
∗∗ = 0.450 (1, 310) t∗∗ = 0.458 (1, 206) t∗∗ = 0.465 (1, 129)
Values of h a = 100, z = 20, a = 100, z = 20, a = 100, z = 20,
훾 = 10,m = 0.7, 훾 = 10,m = 0.7, 훾 = 10,m = 0.7,
퐡 = 0.3 퐡 = 0.4 퐡 = 0.5
Optimal tax for SW
firstscenario
t
∗ = 0.532 (965) t∗ = 0.529 (1, 108) t∗ = 0.526 (1, 277)
Optimal tax for SW
secondscenario
t
∗∗ = 0.465 (1, 048) t∗∗ = 0.458 (1, 206) t∗∗ = 0.450 (1, 394)
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since m ∈ (0, 1) . This implies that changes in the demand parameter a have a negative 
effect in the threshold value of 𝛿 . Therefore, an increase in the market size will decrease 𝛿 
in which case the interval [h, 𝛿) becomes smaller i.e., conflict is less likely to happen and 
thus, it is accompanied by lower taxation.
For an increase in z, the tax is increasing indicating that when the cost of the cleaner 
technology is higher the optimal tax rate is increased to still provide incentives to the firm 
to employ a cleaner technology. This holds for both scenarios since, regardless of whether 
there is a possibility of collaboration with the group or not, an increase in the cost for 
adopting a less polluting technology unaccompanied by an increase in the tax would dis-
courage the firm from incurring that higher cost.
Finally, looking at changes in h, we can see that a smaller h requires a less stringent 
environmental policy. Recall that h is the lower bound of the interval that 훿 can take values 
from. In other words, a smaller h makes the range of the values that 훿 can take larger sug-
gesting that the EG can be more effective in its campaign against the firm shrinking more 
the demand. Therefore, it implies a lower optimal tax rate in both scenarios. Again, tax 
under pure conflict is higher than the case where both collaboration and conflict are the 
EG’s options.
All in all, the results of this numerical exercise offer a comparative static analysis as 
well as support our finding that environmental policy should be less stringent when the 
EG faces the choice between collaboration and conflict –which is indeed a decision that 
groups in reality, at least to some extent, face. Looking at the numbers in parentheses, i.e., 
the SW values after substituting the parameters values to Eqs. 7 and 10, we also find that 
SW is higher in the second scenario as the optimal tax is lower compared to the first, pure 
conflict, scenario.
3  Conclusion
The idea of environmentalists clashing with firms is not new; what is novel in recent years 
is the phenomenon of green alliances, the collaboration between a firm and an environmen-
tal group in developing and implementing a cleaner production technology. The former 
notion has already been well examined in the literature. However, to the best of our knowl-
edge, the option of cooperation between these two players has not been modelled and thus 
this paper signifies a first attempt towards this direction.
In particular, environmentalists can either act against the firm and the consequences of 
its polluting production which will reduce emissions via a contraction in demand or join 
forces with the firm and share their know-how which will provide incentives to the firm 
to employ a cleaner technology through the decrease in its cost of adoption. The group 
makes its decision based on which option entails less pollution and it is affected by an 
environmental tax set by the government. This, then, impacts firm’s choices on output and 
emission intensity.
We have shown that higher taxes make the conflict case more likely to happen, indicat-
ing that collaboration and a more stringent environmental policy are substitutes. This sheds 
light to a previously unexplored, possibly adverse effect of public policy on environmental 
quality because it mitigates the impact of the pollution tax on emission intensity since the 
latter is higher under conflict and leads to lower output.
We also characterise analytically and by means of numerical examples the optimal tax. 
We find that in the case where conflict is the only option for the environmentalists the tax 
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is higher relative to the case where the group can choose either to conflict or collaborate 
with the firm, implying that a less stringent environmental policy is required in the second 
scenario. This is due to the way that the environmental tax alters the probability of conflict 
compared to collaboration in favour of the former.
Our analysis provides a first attempt to embrace the changing landscape in the relation-
ship between a firm and an environmental group and opens the way for future research. 
For instance, it would be interesting to examine a framework where the firm would not be 
always willing to collaborate with the group or having more than one firm in the market to 
explore the interactions between them e.g., monopolistic competition, multi-firm oligopoly. 
This setup would open the door to the understanding of which firm will manage to collabo-
rate with the environmentalists and the effects on pollution and welfare since attention has 
been restricted in the monopoly scenario in this model. As a second potential future line of 
research, it would make sense to allow for the EG to have the ability to both collaborate by 
transferring know-how and conflict (most likely at an industry-level) by lowering demand, 
particularly as the aim of the EG is to minimise emissions. In this paper we are restricting 
the decision space of the EG by having it either collaborating or conflicting; however, mod-
elling this sort of “combined” decision by the EG may help expand the applicability of the 
model along with its implications for policy.
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Appendix
Assumption 1 This assumption implies that, for given demand conditions, collaboration 
always reduces total emissions. Formally,
The LHS of the inequality is a function of m. In particular,
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This expression is decreasing in m. As long as ai − 𝛾 > 4
√
zt ∀ai then 𝜕(LHS)
𝜕m
> 0 
∀m ∈ (0, 1) . Thus, the inequality (ai − 𝛾 − 2
√
zmt)
√
m < ai − 𝛾 − 2
√
zt holds ∀m ∈ (0, 1) . 
Note that assuming ah − 𝛾 > 4
√
zt is sufficient for the non-negativity constraint on output 
ah − 훾 ≥ 2√zt (Eq. 3) to hold in order avoid a corner solution.
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